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Introduction
The role of social pressure on behavior is an important element in many areas of the society (e.g., for workplace productivity, politics, the judicial system, social customs and sports).
There is a voluminous theoretical literature in economics that deals with this topic (see e.g. Akerlof 1980 , Bernheim 1994 , and Becker and Murphy 2000) but there is considerably less empirical work. 1 The contribution of this paper is to provide such evidence from the impact of spectators on the behavior of referees. We use a unique exogenous source of variation in the number of spectators due to hooligan violence in Italy on February 2, 2007. In response to the incident, the Italian minister of interior declared that spectators would only be allowed into those arenas that fulfilled certain requirements. In total, 24 games have so far been played without spectators in the Italian soccer leagues Serie A and Serie B.
Our empirical identification strategy is to compare the behavior of the same referee in games with and without spectators, i.e., we make use of referee specific-fixed effect specifications. We find large and statistically significant effects that away players received fewer punishments (i.e., fewer fouls and cards) in the games they played without spectators while the home players were often punished more harshly. This strongly suggests that pressure from the spectators affects the referees' behavior. This paper is related to a small literature on the behavior of referees. For example, Garicano et al. (2005) and Dohmen (2005) find that referees systematically favor the home team by shortening close games where the home team is ahead, and lengthening close games where the home team is behind.
2 Thanks to the exogenous source of variation in the number of spectators in the Italian soccer leagues, we believe that our research strategy adds considerably to this literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data, the source of exogenous variation, and the empirical strategy. The results are presented in Section 3 and Section 4 concludes. Table 1 shows the games that have been played without spectators.
Data and empirical framework
Referees control the games by having the possibility to adjudicate fouls, yellow cards, and red cards. Committing a foul implies that the opposing team gets possession of the ball.
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If one player receives two yellow cards, or one instant red card, then he is sent off the pitch.
This implies that his team has to play one man short, which is a significant disadvantage. The data is obtained from the Italian newspaper La Gazzetta dello Sport's home page.
Because the number of fouls per game differs across sources, we also use data on fouls from the home page of ESPN (the Entertainment and Sports Programming Network). Table 2 provides summary statistics for home and away teams regarding the number of fouls, the number of yellow cards, and the number of red cards.
To test whether referees are biased due to social pressure we use the following set up.
Let Y ij denote referee i's behavior in game j (fouls, yellow cards, and red cards) and let no_spectators be an indicator variable for the games when the teams were forced to play without any spectators. We can now estimate the effect of having no spectators on the referee's behavior by running the regression
(1)
where α j is a referee fixed effect. The parameter β measures the effect of having no spectators on the behavior of the referee. It is important to note that the parameter β is identified only by the within referee variation since we include fixed referee effects. In other words, we compare the behavior of the same referee when he is a referee in a game with no spectators compared to a game with many thousands of spectators. 8 To be able to test whether the referee is biased, we separate the behavioral response of a referee towards both the home team and the away team in games with many or with no spectators. The referee is biased if he would give the home team more punishments (e.g., fouls, yellow cards and red cards) compared to the away team in the games without spectators. In other words, we estimate separate regressions of (1) for both the home team and the away team, and define the bias of the referee as the difference between the coefficient β for the home team, then we find it likely that home teams play more intensively in front of spectators. Thus, if anything, our estimate of the size of the bias of the referee is likely to be underestimated.
Results
In this section we provide evidence on the behavior of Italian referees, i.e., results from estimating equation (1) for both the home and away teams. Table 3 shows the results from these regressions. Columns 1 and 2 display the results for the number of fouls. The results are striking: while the referee gives the away team 2.6 fewer fouls when there are no spectators, he gives the home team 1.7 more fouls. Thus the estimate of the referee bias is 1.7-(-2.6) = 4.3 fouls. This is highly statistically significant as can be seen by the t-test for equality of the two parameters, β
Home =β
Away in the third row of the column. Since the average number of fouls is 19 per team and game, the bias effect is as high as 23 percent. Tables 5 and 6 respectively (the estimated effects are however less precisely measured). Taken together, the consistency of the estimated bias effect across different specifications and across different outcomes of the referee strongly suggests that the estimated referee effect is caused by social pressure from the crowd.
Conclusions
Soccer referees are supposed to be neutral. Yet, we find evidence that Italian referees change their behavior in games played without spectators. The evidence we provide is consistent with the idea that individuals are likely to change their behavior under influence of social pressure.
An alternative explanation of our findings is that players, rather than referees, change their behavior in games without spectators. However, for this explanation to be true, home players must play less intensively in games with spectators compared to without. We find it more reasonable that home teams play more aggressively in games with spectators.
Thus, we are probably understating the true referee bias effect.
Our results may have further implications outside the world of sports. For example, courts and politicians could be affected by pressure from media, which may affect their decisions. More empirical work on this topic would complement the findings in this study. 
